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Abstract
The broadly discussed TARGET2 imbalances in the European Monetary
Union result from the fact that there is no settlement mechanism such like the
Interdistrict Settlement Accounts (ISA) in the Fed system. The proposal of
Brunnermeier at al. (2011, 2017) of so-called European Safe Bonds (ESBies),
although designed for different purposes, could be used as a remedy of this
problem. In this brief note I suggest to use ESBies as a standardized safe
asset for settling cross-border transfers of deposits.
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1 The TARGET2 imbalances
In case of cross-border payments within the European Monetary Union (EMU),
deposits are transferred from a commercial bank in country A to another bank in
country B. On the assets side, also the corresponding reserves move from one bank to
the other. However, the reserves of a bank are a claim against the National Central
Bank (NCB), and have their counterpart on the liability side of the NCB’s balance
sheet. Due to this transaction, country A has an outflow of reserves while the asset
side of the NCB’s balance sheet is unchanged. This means that now the NCB of
country A has a liability against the Eurosystem while the NCB in the receiving
country B has a corresponding claim against the Eurosystem, the TARGET2 (or
short: T2) balance (see Appendix, panel I for a simplified accounting record).
Such balances occur by construction and are a necessary consequence of the fact
that the Eurosystem should facilitate any money transfer even across brorders with-
out any frictions (Bindseil/Ko¨nig 2011). Permanently increasing T2 positions are
an indicator of imbalances in the balance of payment of a country. These might
stem from unbalanced trade accounts but might also been driven by capital flight.
Basically, sustaining large T2 positions indicate macroeconomic disparities across
the EMU member states.
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There has been (and is still going on) a debate in the literature how to interpret
these imbalances. According to Sinn/Wollmersha¨user (2011) they are seen as a sort
of credit which “finances” the trade deficit (see also Sinn 2012a, 2012b). Other
authors contradict (see Bindseil/Ko¨nig 2011, see Burgold/Voll 2012 for a critical
discussion). It is not the purpose of this paper to contribute to this debate. I would
only like to remark that with a slightly different construction of the EMU, namely
with an ECB but without National Central Banks, no T2 imbalances could occur,
and there would never have been such a debate about its interpretation as “debt” –
although the underlying economic transactions would probably be the same.
While I support the ECB’s view that T2 (im)balances are more a technical issue
rather than an economic one – but of course the reasons which drive the T2 im-
balances are a big economic concern –, there are nevertheless two problems for the
EMU: Firstly, country A which has an outflow of reserves will typically have a
liquidity problem. If commercial banks want to back deposits by reserves due to
liquidity considerations, the ratio between deposits and reserves is then worse after
the outflow. They need more reserves, and the NCB will have to accomodate this
in order to facilitate domestic monetary transactions. That means that the country
which experiences a trade deficit and outflow of capital will produce more central
bank money (see Appendix, panel I, accounring record 2). Contrary, in country B
there is less need for reserves so that its NCB might eventually reduce the balance
sheet size. The focus of the money base creation process thus moves to the weak
countries. As this is driven by the domestic liquidity needs, the ECB has not much
leewayes to reduce this effect. Secondly, in case that country A leaves the Eurozone
there are still claims of the Eurosystem against the NCB of country A. It is not clear
what will happen in that case as it is not regulated in statutes. As the claims are
denominated in Euro, a return to a (strongly devalued) national currency implies
that the real value of the Euro liabilities increase and perhaps have to be written off
in case of sovereign default. Technically this would affect mainly those NCBs with
positive T2 claims against the Eurosystem, such like the Deutsche Bundesbank.
The US Fed system is constructed in a different manner. Also the Fed system is
based on different districts with own central banks. In this brief policy note I should
not discuss in detail the technical and legal differences, but it is worth to point out
the main difference: the Interdistrict Settlement Account (ISA) system is based
on an asset (SOMA portfolio) which is jointly used in all districts, and which can
be used for a settlement of claims of one district CB against another (for details
see Wolman 2013, Voll 2014). For the Eurosystem, H.-W. Sinn also suggested to
introduce a similar instrument, the so-called European Standard Bill (EEAG 2012,
Sinn 2012a) which is used for a sort of “European ISA”. These bills are placed
by the national government in a structured and supervised manner, and they are
backed by collaterals (e.g. future tax payments) so that all bills have the same risk
properties and the same rating. However, there is another, more elaborated proposal
by Brunnermeier et al (2011, 2017) which also aims to create a standardized safe
asset, the ESBies. The aim of this instrument is not the settlement of T2 claims but
to make use of the benefits of pooling and tranching in order to create a common safe
and liquid asset which has the power, e.g. to break the “diabolic loop” between the
sovereign risk and the solvency risks of banks which hold primarly national sovereign
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debt papers (Brunnermeier et al. 2015). I just propose to use this instrument also
for a settlement for T2 claims as well.
2 The ESBies proposal
In a nutshell, the proposal by Brunnermeier et al (2011, 2017) makes use of the
benefits of financial intermediation, namely pooling and tranching. It suggests that
an agency (e.g. European Debt Agency, EDA) buys national sovereign bonds based
on specific portfolio considrations. The pooling effect implies that the risk of the
portfolio is less than the average risk of the particular papers in the pool as it is not
very likely that several papers default at the same time, even when taking spillover
effects into account. The next step is to securitize this portfolio and issue a synthetic
asset which is fully backed by this portfolio. Furthermore, the proposal suggests to
split this ABS by constructing a senior tranche (ESBie) with primary claims, and a
junior tranche (EJBie) with seconday claims. That means that in case of a default
of one or several papers, first the claims of the senior tranche are served. Therefore
the splitting point can be chosen such that the senior tranche is (at least, as the
authors say) as safe as the best rated asset in the portfolio, e.g. a German bond.
Correspondingly, the return and risk of the junior tranche is of course higher.
The authors run a couple of simulations for a portfolio where the composition is
based (among other criteria) on country risks as expressed by rankings, and they
conduct simulations for “normal times” as well as for adverse scenarios. Also country
spillover effects are taken into account. They prove by these numerical simulations
that the ESBies will be safe even in case of adverse scenarios. The main advantages
of such an ESBie is that it is a standardized cross-country safe and highly liquid
asset. If it is used as a standard instruments in commercial bank’s liquidity man-
agement, the problem of the “diabolic loop” might be resolved (Brunnermeier et al.
2015). This loop describes the positive feedback mechanism between sovereign risk
of default, the corresponding fall of prices of domestic bonds which harms the banks
which predominantly hold these domestic bonds, and which then have eventually be
rescued by the national taxpayers – which again fuels the sovereign debt problems.
Moreover, the ECB and NCBs would have a common instrument for open market
operations, and the ESBies could also serve as the standard collateral for central
bank loans. Although the emitting institution (EDA) absorbs existing sovereign
bonds, the emission of ESBies is at least as high as the AAA-rated papers included
in this portfolio because due to pooling and tranching also some slightly less rated
papers now contribute to the ESBies. That’s one of the benefits of intermediation.
A further advantage is that a common instrument rather than a variety of more or
less high ranked papers reduces market segmentaion and enhances liquidiy (reducing
liquidity premia). Therefore, also the problem of “flight-to-safety” in case of financial
turmoils should be reduced.
Two points should be very clear: (a) ESBies are not an additional source of funding
public expenditures. No government can issues ESBies as it is a synthetic paper
based on bonds of all governments. The permanent creation of ESBies requires that
papers are purchased, pooled, and tranched. The portfolio composition and the
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tranching depends on eventually varying default risks. As a government will have
an interest in a stable market where they can place their bonds, and where the EDA
will be one of the big demanders, they shall have an interest in good ratings. In
case of significantly increasing sovereign risk or even a default, the papers will not
be considered for securitization anymore. So this proposal will not be detrimental
for fiscal discipline. (b) By construction of the ABS there is no joint liability for the
debt. If a state defaults, the own bonds as well as the EJBies will be affected (as
ESBies have primary claims) but no other government has to step in. Of course this
depends on a proper management of the portfolio and correctly adjusted portfolio
weights in order to secure the ESBie holders from such adverse scenarios. In contrast
to Eurobonds which explicitly have a joint liability (which should make such a bond
attarctive to investors), ESBies will thus not contribute to Moral Hazard problems
as Brunnermeier at al. (2011) point out. As a variant one could think about an
additional collateralization of ESBies according to similar rules as in the European
Standard Bill proposal by EEAG (2012). This would imply that countries contribute
to the collateral according to their sovereign risk (see also Gopal/Pasche (2012) for
a similar approach).
It has been discussed already that ESBies might also be used for an exit strategy
from the massive QE programme of the ECB (Braunberger 2017). Also the ECB
could sell a part of their assets to the EDA agency and receive ESBBies instead,
which then could be sold more easily (e.g. to commercial banks). Moreover, the
creation of ESBies might include some maturity transformation. As suggested in
the following chapter, they can also be used for a settlement of T2 claims. This
would contribute to the advantages of this proposal. However, it should be clear,
that the ESBies proposal is not a remedy, i.e. it will not automatically solve the
European sovereign debt crisis, it will not solve structural problems, and it will not
solve the problems of a misconstructed EMU system.
3 Basic settlement mechanisms
3.1 Transfer via NCB
The simple idea is that T2 positions are settled by a transfer of ESBies to the
Eurosystem. A NCB with an outflow of reserves has to back them by transfering
ESBies (shortening of the balance sheet), while the receiving NCB will not only
receive reserves but also ESBies (extension of the balance sheet). The accounting
records can be seen in panel II in the Appendix. The details when such a settlement
has to take place (e.g. on a monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis) will not be discussed
here.
Central banks therefore always need enough ESBies on their asset side. This means
that such a settlement system implies that monetary policy is at least partially
conducted via the purchase of assets (ESBies) by open market operations. As NCBs
do not buy domestic sovereign bonds but ESBies, there is no direct nexus between
the NCB’s and the domestic government’s balance sheets. If a NCB does not have
enough ESBies for settlement it has to buy them from their banking system. This
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enlarges the monetary base in that country. But this is not a specific disadvantage
because even in the existing system the outflow of reserves and deposits requires that
the domestic banking system demands more liquidity which has to be accomodated
by the NCB (see accounting record 2 in panel II in the Appendix).
Such a settlement mechanism has the advantage that in case of an exit of country
A from the Eurozone there are no open claims of the Eurosystem against the NCB
of that country. This might be a prerequisite for a future structured mechanism of
a regulated (temporary) exit from the European Monetary Union.
However, the problem that the banking system in country A has increased liquidity
needs which shifts the central bank money creation process to the countries with
a trade deficit or capital flight, is still unresolved in this proposal. It has to be
remarked that this additional money creation might, on the one hand, be an ob-
stacle, but on the other hand, NCBs have a function as the lender of last resort,
and they have to accomodate the domestic needs for liquidty in order to maintain
the functioning of money transactions. A settlement mechanism should not just
prevent NCBs from doing so as this could be detrimental for the domestic bank-
ing system. As Konings (2012) critically remarks to Sinn’s proposal of a European
ISA mechaism, a settlement mechanism should be accompanyied with a balancing
mechanism, accomodating the disparate needs of liquidity. Otherwise, in our exam-
ple, if NCB in country A would not fully accomodate the bank’s reserve needs, the
commercaial bank’s liquidity position is weakened and could therefore reinforce the
flight of deposits to country B, leading to destabilization. Therefore, the ESBies
settlement proposal should account for the liquidity needs of the banking system.
3.2 Direct interbank transfer
Any deposit transfer within the domestic banking system implies that also reserves
are transferred from one bank to the other. The net position of the entire banking
system against the NCB does not change as the sum of reserves remains the same.
But in case of cross-border transfers, the T2 balances occur. However, one might
think about a substaintial change of the rules in this case: if a cross-border transfer
of deposits is not backed by reserves but by a standardized asset like ESBies, the
net position of the national banking systems against their NCBs will not be affected
by the transfer. The situation is displayed in panel III in the Appendix.
However, the deposit receiving bank then has an additional demand for reserves
which has to be accomodated by the NCB (see accounring record 2 in panel III
in the Appendix). But in contrast to the current system, the additional money
base is created in the deposit receiving country. Moreover, in the example that
deposits should be backed by 10% reserves, the absolute amount of additionally
created money is much lower than in the current system. However, the next section
shows that a further reduction of additional money creation is possible.
3.3 Combined transfer
Once, when cross-border deposit transfers could be backed by ESBies instead of
reserves, also combinations of ESBies and reserves are possible. As the receiving
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bank needs to back the additional deposits by reserves while the sending bank could
reduce their reserve holding accordingly, the transfer could be backed by a bundle
of ESBies and reserves such that – in the best case – no further liquidity demand
occurs which has to be accomodated by any NCB (see panel IV in Appendix).
In this case the reserve transfer is handled like in panel II, namely the NCB of
country A has to settle it by an ESBies transfer so that no T2 balance will occur. A
pressure on additional money creation might occur only if the liquidity management
of both banks is different, e.g. that one bank wishes to hold 5% of their deposits
as reserves while the other bank wants to hold 10%. In case of discrepancy one
might think about a rule how to solve that problem, e.g. the bundle of ESBies and
reserves has to be designed such that (i) it suits for the bank with the higher reserve
demand, or (ii) it leads to an additional reserve demand in the receiving country.
But in any case the problems of unsettled NCB claims and liabilities is solved, and
the pressure on additional money creation is minimized.
4 Conclusion
The main obstacles come from the legal side: the implementation of such a proposal
requires significant changes of the legal rules as well as some changes in the monetary
policy operations:
• The general legal and organizational issues regarding the creation of ESBies
are discussed by Brunnermeier et al. (2011, 2017) and should not be repeated
here. The proposal in this paper requires that ESBies are used as a stan-
dard instrument of monetary policy so that it is on the balance sheet of each
commercial bank as well as on the NCB’s balance sheets. Monetary policy
therefore has at least partially be conducted by purchasing such assets (beside
repo transactions).
• In cross-border transactions ESBies have to be treated as a standard asset
which has to be accepted for settling T2 claims.
• In case of direct or combined transfers, cross-border deposit transfers between
commercial banks, in contrast to intra-country transfers, are backed by ESBies
or a bundle of reserves and ESBies. This is a major difference which requires
adaption of the legal conditions.
The advantages of this proposal are clear: risks of writing off unsettled claims in
case of an exit from the Eurozone can be avoided, and pressure on the creation of
additional central bank liquidity is minimized and could be loacted into the core
instead of the periphery of the Eurozone.
In case that the ECB as well as the NCBs sell a significant part of their sovereign
bonds to the EDA and receive ESBies instead, the securitization process could be
used to settle already existing large T2 balances. E.g. a NCB with T2 liabilities
would receive less ESBies which thus reduces or eliminates their T2 liabilities. Ac-
cordingly, NCBs with T2 claims would receive more ESBies which then substitute
these T2 claims.
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Appendix
In the subsequent table the following conventions and assumptions hold true:
D deposits
R reserves
T2 TARGET2 balance
C central bank credit
E ESBies
We assume that a bank in country A transfers deposits of value 100 to a bank in
country B (accounting record 1). Moreover, each bank wants to back their deposits
by 10% reserves (required plus excess reserves) as a result of their liquidity manage-
ment. We assume that additional liquidity needs of a bank will be accomodated by
the NCB (accounting record 2). We neglect that a reduction of deposits could even-
tually lead to a reduction of reserves. We focus only on the pressure to additional
money creation.
The ECB’s balance sheet is not displayed. Henceforth, the T2 balances should not
be interpreted that NCB B has a direct claim against NCB A after the transfer (but
against the Eurosystem).
Panel I Current system with TARGET2
Panel II System with immediate settlement with ESBies
Panel III Interbank deposit transfer backed by ESBies instead of reserves
Panel IV Interbank deposit transfer backed by a mixture of ESBies and
reserves, where reserve transfers are settled with ESBies
(mix of panel II and III)
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